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Catherine Herfeld (Witten/Herdecke University)
catherine.herfeld@uni-wh.de
I Introduction
Nowadays it is widely accepted that social norms play a signifi-
cant role in the explanation of cooperative behaviour and the main-
tenance of social order. People use social norms such as fairness, reci-
procity, and promise-keeping to interact with each other (Henrich,
2000). While explaining human behaviour, economists have realized
that the concept of social norms can contribute to the understand-
ing of (economic) behaviour (Basu and Weibull, 2003; Conlin et al.,
2003; Fehr et al., 1998; Kahneman et al., 1986; Lindbeck et al., 1999).
Despite the problem that social norms are a) hard to measure and
b) only vaguely understood in terms of their actual influence on peo-
ple’s behaviour, economists increasingly integrate social norms into
their frameworks (Akerlof, 1982; Bicchieri, 2006; Conlin et al., 2003;
Fehr et al., 1998). The framework I am mainly referring to here is
the theory of rational choice (RCT).
When explaining action by using RCT, economists focus on ob-
servable behaviour. Such observed behaviours are then attributed
to desires and beliefs as their causes, usually at the expense of other
possible motivations. Models are based on the behavioural assump-
tion of instrumental rationality and agency is determined by self-
interest. If the agent is rational, his sole motive for action is assumed
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to be personal welfare-improvement (Davis, 2004; Sen, 1985).1 Con-
sequently, the performed action is seen as a form of optimizing be-
haviour, taken to maximize individual utility and to satisfy personal
preferences (Elster, 1989a). Transferring this conception unto the is-
sue of social norms draws a picture of an internal motivating source
for norm-conformity that is purely instrumental in character (Opp,
1999; Coleman, 1990).
Empirical results of ultimatum-, dictator-, or public-good-games
show that economists cannot (always) predict cooperative behaviour.
Instead, individuals will often follow social norms of cooperation at
the expense of self-interest (Bicchieri, 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004). Thus, for the economist, sometimes the motivational force
remains obscure. Now there are at least two ways of accounting for
these ‘behavioral anomalies’: One way is to simply reduce them to
irrational behaviour. This does not seem to be reasonable (Dawes
and Thaler, 1988). If all actions are reduced to mere self-interest,
even defined in a very broad sense (Opp, 1999), RCT becomes ana-
lytical. In this case, its status as a theory is generally questionable.
A second way would be to refer to preferences for social norms as a
solution for this explanatory dilemma. But, as claimed in this paper,
to make social norms work, some additional motives are required to
be in place. Different motives such as commitment play a crucial
role in motivating norm-conformity itself and hence in explaining
cooperation. This is because norm-conformity is often motivated by
commitment. In particular, commitment motivates conformity to
social norms of cooperation, i.e. to the norm of fairness, reciprocity
and promise-keeping, whereby cooperative norms are used to interact
with others. They enable or enhance cooperation among members
of a given group or society (Henrich, 2000). Social norms are key
elements in the provision of public goods. They prescribe solutions
to social dilemma situations, e.g. to collective action problems that
would otherwise exacerbate the provision and the maintenance of so-
cial order. If conformity to these norms is motivated by commitment,
commitment is then a crucial motive in enabling cooperation.
1Welfare here is the satisfaction of preferences and thus understood in the
neoclassical sense. This view is also called “preference satisfaction view” (Haus-
man and McPherson, 2006, p. 120). It implies that maximizing utility leads to
personal welfare improvement, although both notions are not considered as the
same and not synonymous from the philosopher’s point of view.
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To overcome the explanatory shortcomings of the behavioural
foundations of economic theory by preventing RCT from analyticity
and in order to find adequate explanations for norm-conformity, we
have to distinguish between different types of motivation which must
be investigated beyond self-interest. To differentiate these different
types of motivation, it is useful to analyse the normativity involved
in norm-conformity. This will create an understanding of the role
normativity plays in the explanation of norm-conformity. To tackle
the issue, this paper is concerned with finding an answer to the
question ‘what kind of normativity is involved in norm-conformity,
i.e. why do people think that they ought to follow a social norm?’
II Social Norms, Commitment, and Rational Choice Theory
Norm-conformity is often explained by economic frameworks,
such as RCT. However, such frameworks are mainly based on the
assumption of self-interested agents. If a person is modelled to act
in his or her self-interest, this entails that he or she is driven by a
reason consisting of a desire to achieve a certain end and a belief,
that a specific action will achieve this end. Being motivated in this
way implies that the performed action is an instrument for reaching
a further end and therefore excludes the view that an action can be
performed for its own sake. Applying this view to norm-conformity,
the assumption that an agent is motivated by self-interest implies
that the agent’s conformity serves solely as an instrument for him
to achieve a certain further end. Holding a reason of obedience to
a social norm because one aims at some further end, whereas the
conformity would serve as a means to achieve that end, is what I
will call holding an ‘instrumental reason’ for norm-conformity. The
normativity involved in such norm-conformity, i.e. the reason why
people think they ought to follow a social norm, is purely instrumen-
tal in character. In contrast, the motive of commitment provides
people with reasons for obedience that are fundamentally different
in nature. As I will argue in this paper, the motive of commitment
provides practical reasons that are “independent of the gains and
losses for the person in case he or she acts on that reason” (Pauer-
Studer, 2007, p. 75). This is because these commitments are not
based on the agent’s desires (Schmid, 2007). They do not express
what the agent wants. Rather, if a commitment presents a reason
for action this is because commitments, as Searle puts it, create
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desire-independent reasons for action (Searle, 2001). If we accept
commitment to be a relevant motivation for people to follow social
norms, the normativity involved in the resulting norm-conformity
differs from that of the instrumentally-driven norm-conformity de-
scribed above. This difference in the type of normativity involved
in conformity then depends on the motivation of the people.2 As I
argue in this paper, this is why commitment as a motivational force
cannot be analysed by a framework based on the idea of instrumen-
tal action and the motive of self-interest. If this is the case, classical
economic theory cannot explain all types of norm-guided behaviour.
There are three ways to deal with the ensuing explanatory dilemma:
Firstly, many economists simply dismiss the motive of commitment
as an important motivating force for norm-conformity. But this is
problematic, because commitment seems to offer a good explanation
of different normative phenomena such as work motivation, solidar-
ity bonds etc. (Pauer-Studer, 2007). And it provides a useful ac-
count of cooperation observed in experimental settings (Kerr et al.,
1997).3 A second possibility is to ignore the special nature of com-
mitment and just assume that people have a preference for commit-
ment; these approaches explain anomalies with as-if models based
on long-term calculations and self-interest. This seems plausible at
first sight. Economists have highly elaborated upon their concepts
of self-interest and preferences thanks to the openness / flexibility
of the utility-function. However, because all the motives covered by
economic models are ultimately traced back to self-centred agency,
which fundamentally contradicts with what is understood as an ac-
tion motivated by commitment, this does not present a solution ei-
ther. Additionally, defenders of this view are confronted with the
objection of economic explanations then becoming merely analytic.
Assuming a preference for commitment to explain committed be-
haviour seems to lead to a tautological explanation which provides
very little information. The explanandum, i.e. the event or fact to be
explained is at the same time used as part of the explanans, i.e. the
2Whether or not this leads to relativism of normativity will not be discussed
here in greater detail but will be, at least indirectly, referred to later in the paper.
3I will not tackle the issue of providing empirical evidence for the existence of
a motive of commitment in this paper. However, I am aware that this is a very
delicate and important issue where a lot more work needs to be done. Interesting
empirical literature is provided by Kerr et al. (1997).
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mechanism which does the explanation. A third possibility open to
economists is to take commitment seriously as a motivational force,
to admit the explanatory shortcomings of the current framework and
try to adapt it. In this case, the assumption of individual-welfare
maximization and self-interested agency would have to be relaxed or
even rejected (Sen, 1982). I am going to argue for this last possibility.
III Four questions
To develop my argument I shall address the following four ques-
tions:
I. How does classical economic theory explain why people think
they ought to follow a social norm, i.e. what makes individual
norm-conformity normative from the economist’s perspective?
II. What is the nature of this ‘ought’ or the type of normativity
involved in norm-conformity and how does this ‘ought’ or type
of normativity relate to motivation?
III. What is this ‘ought’ or type of normativity grounded upon?
Does it differ between people/cultures and, if so, why?
IV. What role do motives and normativity play in explaining norm-
conformity?
By addressing each of these questions in turn, I hope to show the
methodological implications of analysing the normativity involved in
norm-conformity. I shall leave the conceptual implications for later
analyses.
I.
To address the first question of how classic economic theory explains
why people think they ought to follow a social norm, one must first
understand how actions in general and norm-conformity in particu-
lar are explained by economists and how they define social norms.
Looking at the key features of social norms provides us with an
understanding of the motivation people are assumed to have when
conforming to social norms.
Why people act in the way they do is a difficult question. We
cannot observe people’s motivation for performing a certain action.
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What goes on in people’s heads is often taken to be inaccessible.
People’s minds are black boxes for the economist. However, a lot of
empirical research has been done to find out why people conform to
social norms. In general, the economist’s explanation is based upon
what he generally assumes to be characteristic for a motive of action.
This view of motivation is based on the concept of intentional action
used in folk psychology. An intentional action is a piece of behaviour
which derives from an intention of the individual exhibiting it (El-
ster, 1994). This is what distinguishes action from mere behaviour,
namely that it is done with a purpose or reason (e.g. Anscombe,
1963; Rosenberg, 1995). This means that every individual, when
performing an action has a reason to do so.
Reasons are modelled as being provided by mental states, i.e.
the desire to do something and the belief that a certain action serves
as a means to satisfy this desire (Elster, 1994; Bicchieri, 2006; Haus-
mann, 2005). The motive for action is thus taken to be identified by
providing a reason for an action. In this line of thought, the reason
for an action represents the intention of the agent. If the person acts
rationally, his intention finally motivates, i.e. causes, the action.
Thus, by giving the reason for an action, the motivational structure
of an action is seen as being causal in nature (Davidson, 1963). And
the action of the agent is always assumed to be the intended action,
based on what the agent desired and what he believed to be the
means for fulfilling the desire.4 This implies that the reason given
by an intentional explanation is assumed to be the reason which ul-
timately motivated the agent to perform the action.5 In this sense,
this view supposes that an action is always done for a purpose; it is
purely instrumental in nature.
In the economic language, the desires of the person are translated
into a preference-set. The beliefs a person holds are taken to be
the full set of information available to the agent. Given the end
the agent aims to achieve, his preferences and information motivate
him to perform an action. The action in question is seen as the
4I will not consider exceptions such as akrasia here.
5Note that it remains opaque and also uninteresting what the ultimate reason
of a person is. The person might not be able to identify it and thinks he acted
because of reason X but what really but unconsciously motivated the agent was
reason Y. Or there might be a chain of reasons which jointly caused the action
in question (Rosenberg, 1995).
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best means to achieve his end (which is mostly the satisfaction of
his personal preferences). Assuming this motivational structure, the
action performed can be explained causally.
Preferences and beliefs are required to be internally and mutu-
ally consistent to call a choice instrumentally rational (Elster, 1994).
However, consistency alone does not imply any kind of normativity
of the agent’s intentions in the sense that desires, the beliefs or the
end pursued have valuable content for the agent or that the end is
perceived as right in a more profound sense (Raz, 2005) — right
in the sense that the agent believes or values it as a good or right
thing, independent of what he is inclined to do or what would satisfy
his preferences. There is also no space for the agent considering the
action itself as worth pursuing, independently of his personal pref-
erences.6 What the agent evaluates or chooses as the right action
goes back to the agent’s ordering of his preference set. The agent
orders his preferences on a scale. The measure is ‘utility’ and the
ordering is represented by the utility offered by different (material or
immaterial) goods. According to this order, the agent evaluates the
outcomes of his actions; he chooses an action and acts accordingly.
The judgement is assumed to be exclusively based on the criterion
or principle of utility maximization. Because the outcome of the ac-
tions are ideally the fulfilment (or exceeding) of the actor’s desires,
the satisfaction of desires is assumed to always be the person’s main
end and the action is therefore said to be in his or her self-interest
(Heap Hargreaves et al., 1992). In short, “desires [or preferences]
are the unmoved movers” for human action in economic theory (El-
ster, 1989b, p. 4). The limited empirical basis for unobservable
preferences or desires does not present a problem in this context.
Instead, it is simply claimed that the observed action reveals the
preference. And preferences reveal the motivations involved. In this
understanding, different preferences (re-)present different motives;
and preferences are given to economic theory.7
6To say that somebody prefers one state of affairs X to another Y “is to
describe a mental state of that person which disposes her to choose actions which
lead to X rather than actions which lead to Y” (Sugden, 2000).
7This relates to the idea of revealed preferences where it is said that the action
taken reveals the preference which motivated the action (Samuelson, 1938; Sen,
1977). This is not necessarily true. Somebody who is going to church might be
acting on purely selfish terms but reveals the same preference as a firm believer.
However, there is still an explanation missing why some people are motivated
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If one transfers this general picture of action-explanation out-
lined above to the case of social norms, conformity is seen as purely
instrumental. An instrumentally rational agent has a prudential or
— as I would call it — ‘instrumental reason’ to obey the norm be-
cause norm-conformity presents the best strategy in this particular
situation, given the strategies of all other players involved.8 Thus,
the economist has a clear response to question I: norm-conformity
is normative for an instrumentally rational agent because it is — in
one way or another — in his self-interest to do so. In the following
I will talk about ‘instrumental normativity’ in this context. Does
this view of ‘instrumental normativity’ really fit the concept of what
we think a social norm is or represents? Let us first clarify what is
generally understood among economists to be a social norm.
Within various ontological views and explanatory accounts, there
is no unified definition of a social norm used by social scientists
(Hechter and Opp, 2001; Stout, 2001; Okruch, 1999). However,
there are some key features or properties generally considered to
be common to social norms. First, social norms are characterized
as informal rules of behaviour “that people follow for some reason
other than the fear of legal sanctions” (Stout, 2001, p. 6). This
means that they are not enforced by a formal agency in contrast
to formal institutions, e.g. legal norms. Instead, they are enforced
by informal sanctions executed by third parties, for example through
social forces such as the exclusion from a social group by its members
(Mantzavinos, 2001).
The informal character of social norms leads to the second fea-
ture, their social aspect. They are social in the sense that they are
assumed to exist in every society, every subgroup of society and any
kind of organisational structure (Kirchga¨ssner, 2006). In economic
approaches, social norms are often assumed to be localized in peo-
ple’s preference set. The agent is modelled to have a preference for a
social norm. This can be either by being (a) accepted by the mem-
bers of a group or society or (b) through the internalization of the
social norm by the individuals through the process of socialization
differently than others (Kurzban and Houser, 2005).
8Bicchieri defines a prudential reason for action as “if you have a goal X and
the best available means to attain X is a course of action y, then you ought to
adopt Y” (2006: 14). This is similar of having what I called ’instrumental reason’
as an instrumentally rational agent.
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(Hechter and Opp, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). In (a), the
social norm is generally realized and consciously followed by the peo-
ple, i.e. conformity involves choice on the part of the agent, based
upon a preference for the end for which norm-conformity is the best
means. Thus, social norms serve to as means for the individual to
achieve or satisfy certain ends that directly affect its personal welfare.
In case (b), the social norm can be followed unconsciously. Here, the
social norm itself is considered to be the dominant preference of the
agent. Thus, internalized norms indirectly affect the personal welfare
of the individual through (positive or negative) emotions or external
but informal (positive or negative) sanctioning.
There has been plenty of discussion about this ‘narrow’ behavioural
basis of economic theory when using the ‘preference-approach’ to
explain norm-conformity. The discussion is mainly centred on the
assumption of the self-centred or selfish agent. It is claimed that
many possible motives cannot be accounted for in this framework
(Sen, 1985). As a possible solution economists invent a very broad
notion of self-interest. The concept of preference has been extended
to all kinds of tastes that people can have: material, immaterial, pro-
social/altruistic/conditional, emotive, etc.9 Thereby, self-interest
becomes definitional to actions and social norms are also allowed
to be motivated by altruism or other-regarding preferences. Even in
these cases, conformity can be explained by classical economic the-
ory as long as individual choices are made consistently with people’s
set of preferences (e.g. Bicchieri, 2006; Stout, 2001; Coleman, 1987;
Elster, 1989a; Woodward, 2009). But what matters for the argument
in this paper is that — in these explanations outlined above — all
action based on preferences always goes back to personal welfare-
improvement and self-interest. Why is that problematic?
9The economic framework is used to accommodate 1) all types of social con-
cerns, altruism, emotions, and informal sanctioning (reputation, esteem, social
disapproval, disesteem, etc.). It 2) accommodates completely unaware, auto-
matic and blindly norm-conformity. It 3) can explain social norms as means to
internalize externalities such as for example littering (e.g. Coleman, 1987). 4)
Norm-conformity is considered as instrumentally rational when motivated by di-
rect sanctions and indirectly by emotions. And rational choice theory accounts
5) for norm-guided behaviour based on the idea of conditional cooperation, thus
when we believe that other people conform to social norms and also expect us to
do so in a specific situation.
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Let’s take the case of an altruistic action. To explain altruism,
the economist equips the agent with an altruistic preference. Al-
truism can be defined as “costly acts that confer economic benefits
on other individuals” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, p. 785). The
agent acts altruistically because enhancing other people’s welfare is
what he is aiming at, i.e. his preference. His ultimate desires, i.e.
preferences, are completely other-regarding (Bicchieri, 2006). But is
this picture of the economist really what we understand to be altru-
istic? The agent prefers acting altruistically and caring about other
people’s welfare because his welfare depends on the outcome. His
welfare is ultimately affected through present or future immaterial
rewards. By acting altruistically, the agent improves his personal
welfare to the extent of, for example, ‘feeling good’ or being socially
esteemed. Altruism lies in his self-interest because of other than al-
truistic reasons, i.e. it is not his intention to be an altruist in the
first place. It is simply the outcome of an action from which he
benefits. This means that he does not care about the intrinsic value
of altruism in the first place. He does not judge altruism itself as
the right thing to do, as there is no judgement involved indepen-
dent of personal welfare-improvement. It is only because he has a
preference for altruism, which allows him to ultimately improve his
personal welfare that he acts in the way that he does. Preferring
altruistic behaviour is contingent and conditional on the outcome
received by acting altruistically. But wouldn’t we expect a Mother
Theresa to be somehow unconditionally altruistic? Do we not think
that, because she judges the intrinsic property of an altruistic ac-
tion as being the right thing to do, that, if this judgement is based
on her values, the performance of altruistic action becomes uncon-
ditionally necessary for her, i.e. independent of any rewards? And
isn’t this because she committed herself to certain religious values
of a community which can be represented and implemented by the
performance of an altruistic action? One could argue that an act
may be utility-maximizing for a person because it satisfies the per-
son’s preferences yet at the same time reduces the personal welfare.
Especially in the aforementioned example it seems hard to see how
an unconditional and altruistic act benefits Mother Theresa, i.e. her
level of personal welfare, in any real sense, although we could at the
same time say that it satisfies her altruistic preference. Could we
not simply say that the action in this case is consistent with utility-
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maximization yet welfare-decreasing acts? This argument is valid
when one considers welfare and utility-maximization to be funda-
mentally different. And we already made clear that we do not, as
formal RCT equals them (Hausman and McPherson, 2006). The
point I want to make here is that the concept of preferences is often
misleading when it comes to explaining norm-conformity. Although
it does not completely dismiss the normative dimension of agency,
it gives a particular and overly narrow interpretation of this dimen-
sion. The capacity of a person to accept obligations and duties as
motivating, to undertake judgements about right or wrong, good or
bad, independent from immediate and self-centred desires, the ca-
pacity to base or adjust one’s actions on these judgements and the
capacity of self-determination/self-formation and self-control cannot
be accounted for when taking the instrumental view of normativity
that RCT implies.
As we have seen, when reducing norm-conformity to actions that
are purely instrumental in character, the normativity involved in
such actions is itself instrumental when the improvement of personal
welfare is always the ultimate aim. This view contradicts the norma-
tive dimension of agency.10 But this normative dimension seems to
matter in the context of norm-conformity. That norms are often seen
as prescribing how we ought to behave in certain situations seems
to be left out by the economists view. This leads to the question II,
which I want to address, namely what is the nature of this ‘ought’
or the type of normativity involved in norm-conformity?
II.
The underlying problem of explaining norm-conformity with tools
from economics is that norm-conformity seems to involve an instru-
mental and a normative aspect. A quick look over the literature
allows us to pick out overlapping notions such as ‘expectations’,
‘obligatory’, ‘value-judgements’, ‘right’, or ‘wrong’ and ‘authorita-
tive’ when it comes to defining social norms (Anderson, 2000; Bic-
chieri, 2006; Coleman, 1987; Elster, 1989a; Hechter and Opp, 2001).
These normative notions suggest a type of normativity attached to
10An exception is the position of ethical egoism, i.e. the normative ethical
position that moral agents ought to only do what is in their own self-interest, can
be considered as normative dimension of agency.
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norm-conformity that is different from the consistency-requirement
postulated by RC-models. Social norms are not regarded as mere
regularities in people’s behaviour which can be observed.11 Neither
are they considered to be completely contingent in the sense that peo-
ple’s conformity varies fundamentally depending on their expected
utilities in each situation.12 Instead, social norms can be seen as
more or less stable “prescriptions that establish how one ought to
behave” within a community (Woodward, 2009, p. 33, my italics).
They are defined as “standards of behaviour that are based on widely
shared beliefs how individual group members ought to behave in a
given situation” within the community (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004,
p. 185, my italics). They are said to “reinforce certain patterns of
behaviour . . . by representing these patterns as desirable or obliga-
tory” within a community (Pettit, 1990, p. 725, my italics). In this
sense, a social norm is a rule prescribing or proscribing behaviour.
— It presents a statement of the form of a conditional, hypothetical
imperative “in situation X, you ought to do Y” (they are conditional
only on the circumstances and not, as instrumental rationality as-
sumes, exclusively on outcomes) or of an unconditional, categorical
imperative ‘you should do X’ (Elster, 1989a, p. 98, my italics).
People accept the social norm as a standard of evaluation for the
behaviour on a collective level. Thus, these standards of right and
wrong, i.e. the social norms themselves, have to be at least ‘pas-
sively’ approved of, if not actively ratified, enforced and followed as
well as implemented by the individual.13 The important point here
is that such a collective acceptance requires a shared understanding
of what is regarded as socially appropriate/inappropriate among the
11Bicchieri contrast social norms with descriptive norms such as fashions and
fads, whereas the latter are mere regularities which can be observed. According
to Bicchieri and in line with my argument, what classifies collective behaviour as
a descriptive or a social norm is a) the motives of the people involved and b) the
expectations of the people within the community (Bicchieri, 2006).
12There is a lot of empirical evidence that people’s conformity varies from
situation to situation but generally, social norms are often observed to be stable
over time.
13‘Passively approved of’ in this context means, that the existence of a norm
is accepted even if people avoid situations where the conformity to a social norm
would have been expected, like the example of the Ik people shows (Turnbull,
1972). Thus, even if people do not follow the social norm, its existence is common
knowledge and thus not denied and can therefore be assumed to be passively
accepted.
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individuals within a community (Krupka and Weber, 2008). But is it
not that such a shared understanding of the required behaviour needs
to have a basis for agreement, something like a standard, a principle
or rationale on which an evaluation can be based? Such a basis is
normally provided by certain fundamental evaluative principles or
values of which the individual approves. Because the individual ap-
proves of these values and principles, he uses them to evaluate and
judge actions as the right/wrong thing to do and finally perform the
action. I argue that these standards and principles shape the individ-
ual’s motives; they become part of what motivates the individual in
performing a certain action. And this is why motives matter when
it comes to explanations of norm-conformity. But how exactly do
they shape the agents motives or even provide him with a motive for
action?
We have seen so far that social norms can be either defined as
means to personal welfare-improvement; or they can be defined as
standards for the evaluation of behaviour within a community. Both
views require an evaluation of alternative courses of actions that is
based on an evaluative standard for deciding which course to take.
But in the two cases the individual is assumed to base his choices
on different evaluative principles. In the first case, the evaluation is
assumed to be based on the utility-principle. The individual only
takes into account the satisfaction of his personal preferences as the
main aim. In the second case, the individual bases his evaluation on
a standard which is external to the agent, which is set or prescribed
by the community. In this case, the individual and the social per-
spective matter for the agent’s choice of a course of action. Besides
taking his personal preferences into account, the individual has to
approve or at least accept this evaluative standard or principle of the
community. It requires a shared understanding of what is considered
as right and wrong among the individuals within a community. One
could argue that such a shared understanding is not necessary and
that norm-enforcement is generally secured by informal sanctions
(Bicchieri, 2006; Coleman, 1987; Mantzavinos, 2001). And it is true
that, as long as we do not live in a dictatorship, punishment ad-
mittedly exists to align people’s behaviour to what the community
considers as right or wrong. But it cannot uphold permanent and
constant norm-conformity without any approval at the individual
level, or at least from a group of reasonable size within the society.
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Rather, people approve/disapprove of something which they value
and judge as right or good, something which is in line with what
they are convinced of. Therefore, shared values matter to enforce
social norms.
Let’s come back to the question of how people’s principles and
standards of evaluation relate to their motives for norm-conformity.
The gap between standard or evaluation for judging an action as
right or wrong, the agents’ motivation to perform an action he con-
siders as the right thing to do, and the actual performance of an
action can be closed by introducing the idea of commitment. Before
doing so, it is important to note that especially social norms of co-
operation are operative by supporting value-laden patterns such as
promise-keeping and truth-telling over a period of time. Individu-
als and groups transform their principles and value-orientation into
their individual and collective actions. Social norms such as fairness,
reciprocity, and promise-keeping align people’s behaviours with their
values and principles. Norm-conformity is a means for an agent to
implement the values and principles of that individual and/or at the
same time of the group or society that he is part of. Social norms
can therefore fill a gap between values and principles on the one
hand and conduct on the other (Wallace et al., 2004). Values and
principles are at the same time constitutive for the self-conception
of groups, individuals, and their self-understanding as autonomous
agents. Thus, they play a role in supporting certain virtues (Elster,
1989a).
This is important because it shows the link between people’s
judgements and their motivation. In the case of social norms, peo-
ple’s conformity to them can be one way of revealing what the indi-
vidual considers as being the right thing to do in a situation. In this
case, the individual approves of what is seen to be right in the society.
But, beyond mere approval, the individual can identify with certain
values and principles that are embodied in social norms. The iden-
tification with values and principles generates commitment to them
for groups and their members. In this case, one could say that people
feel committed to these values and principles. And people think they
ought to conform to a social norm because these represent their val-
ues and principles with which they identify apart from the fact that
they are also considered to be right by the rest of the society or the
members of the group. And because the individual has committed
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to these values and principles, he himself judges the conformity to
a social norm as an action which is the right thing to do. Conform-
ing to them makes it possible to reveal the agent’s commitments. It
represents his values and principles and thereby allows for living up
to his standards. Thus, the social norm itself becomes a standard of
evaluation that is based upon and is consistent with what we gen-
erally judge as being good or bad, right or wrong. Thus, people’s
norm-conformity is motivated by commitment to these values and
principles in the first place. Commitment provides the agent with
a reason for norm-obedience; this is how his commitment motivates
him to conform to a norm. But this reason is not instrumental in
nature, because the agent’s judgement in these cases is not based on
the principle of instrumental rationality. The agent’s performance of
the action, i.e. his conformity to the social norm is independent of
his personal situation; it is independent from his self-interest and his
preferences. The appropriate motivation which captures this idea
is his commitment as one possible motive for conformity to social
norms. And the type of ‘normativity of commitment’ involved in
this kind of norm-conformity is not instrumental in character.
Taking up on this idea of a social norm being a standard of
evaluation for approving behaviour, the understanding of why peo-
ple conform to social norms differs significantly from the notions of
agency in classical economics. And this is why the understanding
of the normativity or the nature of the ‘ought’ involved differs too.
Instead of granting the agent all types of preferences as explanation
for his action to find out the motivation behind norm-conformity,
I argue that it is instead rather useful to analyse the normativity
involved in what motivates agents to conform to social norms. I
claim that we have to distinguish between two forms of normativity
involved in norm-conformity: one is what I call ‘instrumental nor-
mativity’, which is well captured by the economic framework and
the notion of preferences. The second is a kind of ‘normativity of
commitment’, which, so the argument goes, cannot be captured by
economic theory. Depending on people’s motivation, they consider
conformity as being normative in either one or both of the two senses
at the same time. This depends on the standard of evaluation they
use. If they evaluate norm-conformity in terms of appropriateness
or inappropriateness, they take the shared values as a basis for their
evaluation. In this case, to follow a social norm is normative for a
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person, i.e. the person recognizes and accepts the normative claim
that that social norm makes on him/her, because the norm embod-
ies the principles and values the individual or group is committed
to. And the “acceptance of a certain normative consideration can
mould the way [one] thinks” (Millar, 09.05.2007, p. 1) and acts.
What motivates people is indirectly the recognition of the claim the
norm makes on them and directly their commitment to the princi-
ples or values embodied in the norm. Against the economists’ view,
personal welfare-improvements are then not the reason for the choice
of the agent; they are not what the agent aims at in the first place
and thus are not what makes norm-conformity normative for them
(Sen, 1977; Hausmann, 2005). In the case of norm-conformity as
being an action motivated by commitment, the agent considers con-
formity as normative for him because of his commitment to what
the social norm embodies, i.e. what is seen as right or wrong — and
his commitment to values and principles which provides the basis for
evaluation of an action to be right or wrong makes the performance
of the action for him necessary, i.e. normative for him.
Why does this whole picture present a problem for the economist?
To see this, we have to understand in detail what characterizes the
motive of commitment and what it implies. The interesting issue
about commitment is that it seems to matter to economists as well
as to philosophers and thus perfectly represents the potential inter-
section of both disciplines. Whilst there is a lot of philosophical
discussion going on about the nature of commitment, what it means
for a person to be committed to something/someone and what com-
mitment aims at, there are only very few economists who take the
importance of commitment as a motive for agency seriously. One of
these is Amartya Sen. In his article Rational Fools: A Critique of
the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory published in 1977,
Sen famously argues against the usefulness of the economist princi-
ple of self-interest as part of the assumption structure in economic
models. He claims that not all motives for action can be reduced to
ultimate self-interest. He remarks that the problem with economic
theory is that “there is no choice-independent way of understanding
someone’s attitude towards alternatives” (Sen, 1977, p. 323). But,
he goes on to say, there is one source of action which does not in-
volve choice in the usual sense. That source of action is the motive
of commitment.
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What does it mean to say that commitment is choice-independent?
This means that, when motivated by commitment, an agent takes
an action even though the consequences of the action will not nec-
essarily affect his personal welfare. So, there is no choice involved in
the usual sense. The person would still perform the action, even if
he believes that it will yield to a negative effect on his personal wel-
fare; he would perform it even if, at the same time, he could perform
an alternative action that would make him better off. Thus, taking
commitment as a possible motive for action, the identity of personal
welfare and individual preferences resulting in choice no longer holds
(Sen, 1977).14 In the case of commitment, personal welfare and per-
sonal choice are separated from one another. As we shall see, the
concept of choice is no longer based on the idea that the chosen al-
ternative always has to be better than all other available options,
i.e. that the choice of a rational agent would result in the optimiza-
tion (or Simon’s idea of satisfaction) of the person’s preferences, and
therefore best improves the level of personal welfare.
To introduce his idea, Sen draws on a distinction between the
motive of sympathy and a motive of commitment, both are differ-
ent types of other-regarding or “altruistic motivation” (Pettit, 2007).
Although a ‘pro-social’ motive, sympathy does not require a depar-
ture from personal welfare or individual utility maximization. As
shown above with the example of altruism, an action motivated by
sympathy is in the same way ultimately self-regarding, which means
that “the concern for others directly affects one’s own welfare” (Sen,
1977, p. 326). One example for the person acting from sympathy
can be taken from Kant’s Groundwork. Kant introduced the friend
of mankind, who finds pleasure in spreading joy around him and
who can take delight in the satisfaction of others. But Kant sees
this satisfaction as an inclination like any other desire a person can
have. He concludes that such an action, even if admirable, has no
moral worth (Kant, 1997). In contrast, an action which is motivated
by duty has moral worth; it is characterized as an action performed
independently of personal desires. Kant illustrates this point by de-
14This identity mainly depends on the underlying understanding of the concept
of a preference or the nature of reasons. As claimed before, personal welfare
and individual utility are (technically) equalled in mainstream economics. This
assumption provides the main basis for conclusions about what we understand
as a preference and what the nature of reasons is (Sen, 1977, 1985).
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scribing a philanthropist acting kindly towards others. He does not
have any inclination which would positively or negatively affect his
state of affairs. He simply acts because duty demands it. According
to Kant, this gives the action a genuine moral worth (ibid.).
Abstracting from one’s personal desires and inclinations implies
that the action is not driven by them. Rather, an action moti-
vated by commitment requires a “counterpreferential choice” from
the part of the agent (Sen, 1977, p. 328). That does not mean, that
the agent is not allowed to have any kind of additional inclination
which makes the action attractive for him. This just means that
under at least one counterfactual condition the personal welfare un-
der the act chosen would be unaffected.15 Hence, the agent would
unconditionally perform the action, i.e. he would have no choice,
because his commitment makes performing the action necessary for
him. And even if these inclinations or desires would not be present,
he would still perform the action in question. An action motivated by
commitment can even imply a choice against one’s personal welfare-
improvement.16 Personal welfare-improvements are not the reason
for the action of the agent; they are not what the agent aims at in
the first place (Sen, 1977; Hausmann, 2005). That means, an action
motivated by commitment is completely non-egoistic.
It seems obvious that there is a close relationship between com-
mitment and moral agency. According to Kant, acting from duty re-
quires a sense of moral commitment. Being committed to moral prin-
ciples is a necessary precondition for acting from duty. Taking Kant’s
motive of duty as one ‘subgroup’ of the general idea of commitment,
Sen’s understanding of commitment is that an action motivated by
commitment is per definitionem independent from the satisfaction
of any kind of inclination or immediate desires the agent is driven
by in a given moment (Kant, 1997). In the case of commitment,
15It has to be noticed that it is difficult to imagine different states of the world
and potential choices for action. However, I will not discuss this difficulty further
here but just present the simple idea of commitment.
16I have to admit that an underlying premise of the argument is the empirical
statement that commitment as characterized in this essay does exist. However,
to ground this claim in empirical evidence seems to be a difficult task. People’s
motivations behind their actions are often seen as black boxes. There is a lot
of empirical research still to be done on filtering out whether there is such a
motivating force as commitment and, if yes, to disentangle this from other motives
which are active at the same time the agent performs a certain action.
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as is the case with actions done from duty, the agent considers the
action as the right thing to do. Consequently, as when acting from
duty, commitment requires the agent to be capable of undertaking
judgment and evaluation, being self-reflected and conscious about
his values and principles upon which he bases his evaluations.17
However, although morality implies commitment, morality should
not be equalled or confused with it. Commitment results in the right
action, although this does not necessarily mean that it results in
what is seen as morally right. A person can also be committed to
an ideology, a political party, or a religious view. A person can be
committed to an organisation, to a social contract, to (moral) prin-
ciples or to god. Right in this context thus just means that the agent
considers the action itself (or the outcome of the action) as worth
pursuing, independent of the personal benefit he can expect from the
outcome of the action. And the agent comes to know that it is the
right thing to do because he evaluates and judges the action on the
basis of the values and principles he holds while comparing possible
alternative actions instead of drawing on the evaluative principle of
utility-maximization. In this sense, an action motivated by commit-
ment is, as a moral action, unconditional and stable. But it does not
necessarily aim at what is the morally right thing to do.
To sum up: the idea of commitment comprises an evaluation of
possible alternatives that is not necessarily carried out by basing it
on moral values; instead, it can be based on any set of values the indi-
vidual in question holds. However, what commitment has in common
with morality, at least understood in a Kantian way, is the existence
of a non-welfarist goal that is altogether removed from individual
preference-satisfaction and the fulfilment of immediate inclination.
And the economist does not allow for this kind of behaviour.
Are there any ways out of this explanatory dilemma? Why not
just assume an unconditional preference for either a certain value or
commitment per se? The third question will be addressed to under-
stand more clearly why even a very open economic model has prob-
17The character of commitment strongly depends on the definition of concepts.
Frankfurt-minded philosophers would interpret commitment in a less evaluative
and a less-cognitive way. According to Frankfurt people do not always know
what they are committed to. Sometimes they believe they are committed to
something they actually are not for example (e.g. Frankfurt, 1971). I just use
Sen’s understanding of commitment here, which seems very much in line with a
Kantian view of moral agency.
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lems integrating the motive of commitment. Where is this ‘ought’
or type of normativity grounded in? Does it differ between different
people/cultures and why?
III.
One recent attempt at defining social norms while taking both types
of normativity into account is by looking at people’s expectations.
People’s preferences for social norms can be put in relation to nor-
mative expectations about actions that a group or the society has
toward an individual or the individual has towards society (Cole-
man, 1987; Bicchieri, 2006). Cristina Bicchieri, one of the most
prominent philosophers who work on social norms, stresses the im-
portance of mutual expectations involved in norm-conformity. Her
Grammar of Society published in 2006 is widely seen as “making
a key contribution to our understanding of the motivations behind
norm-compliance” (Ku¨chle and R´ıos, 2008, p. 118). She considers a
social norm to be a kind of cluster of expectations among a sufficient
number of people who believe that a social norm exists and who ex-
pect that many other people will follow it in certain situations. In
this sense, people have a conditional preference for norm-conformity;
conditional upon expectations about other people’s belief in whether
an action is seen as being right or wrong within a community (Bic-
chieri, 2006).
Bicchieri’s account mainly consists of the following four (individ-
ually) necessary and (jointly) sufficient conditions for the existence
of social norms: (1) People are collectively aware that a norm exists
and that it applies to specific circumstances (contingency). (2) But
the simple presence of the norm does not suffice to guarantee confor-
mity. People also need to have a conditional preferences to conform
to a social norm; conditional on (3) expectations of the following
kind: A person believes that, based on past observations of other’s
behaviour or its consequences, the majority of the people will fol-
low the norm as well (empirical expectations) and (4) a belief that
others expect a person to conform (normative expectations) in the
sense that they believe that everyone ought to conform. Here, ex-
pectations are taken to be reciprocal. Normative expectations can
be accompanied by sanctions but do not have to be. The people
who expect others to conform and who are willing to sanction trans-
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gressions also have to prefer people to conform. What brings in the
instrumental aspect of norm-conformity is that people have to have
a (conditional) preference for conformity and the required beliefs in
addition to the expectations. In line with the classical belief/desire-
framework of rational choice theory, people are finally motivated by
their preferences (Bicchieri, 2006). What brings in the normative
aspect of conformity is the condition of mutually held ‘normative
expectations’ about what people ought to do, based on what people
consider as right or wrong. Let us look at this condition in greater
detail.
The notion of mutually held ‘normative expectations’ introduces
a type of normativity that differs from the mere instrumental norma-
tivity and from having a prudential reason for conformity. It implies
that people not only think that others ought to conform, but that
they also believe that they themselves are expected to conform in
the sense that a reasonable number of people think that one ought
to conform to the social norm. This can suffice to induce a pref-
erence for conformity when “individuals recognize the legitimacy of
others’ expectations and feel an obligation to fulfil them” (2006: 15);
and, once induced, a preference for conformity guarantees that peo-
ple follow the social norm. But it does not need to suffice. In some
cases, Bicchieri claims, potential sanctions are needed to induce a
preference for conforming to the social norm. And expecting sanc-
tion might motivate either in the sense that people fear sanctions
and want to avoid them or because of a desire to please others and
thus be rewarded.
What is of interest for the argument here is the nature of the
‘ought’ in Bicchieri’s account. It can be implicitly contained in the
normative or the empirical belief people hold about others’ expecta-
tions. This is, people think they ought to conform because of their
belief about others’ expectations. In the case of an empirical belief,
people infer from my (consistent) behaviour in the past that I will
do the same in the future, and that this is what I believe (Bicchieri,
2006). If it is a normative belief things look a bit different. Although
normative beliefs do not generally state an obligation, they do so in
Bicchieri’s account (ibid.). In this case, I believe that a sufficiently
large number of people think that I have an obligation to conform
to a social norm in the appropriate circumstances (ibid.). This is
why a person will consider other people’s expectations as legitimate.
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It is not a kind of instrumental normativity, because the motivation
for conformity understood in this sense can but does not have to in-
cur material or immaterial sanctions to guarantee conformity. Also,
conforming to the norm does not simply serve as a means to satisfy
my ends Instead, people consider conformity to the social norm as
their and other people’s obligation or duty. But why does the person
accept this obligation and thus considers other people’s expectations
as legitimate? Bicchieri claims that people think that they (and oth-
ers) are obliged to conform to the norm because they believe it is
the right thing to do. In these cases, social norms are seen as good
or reasonable.18 But how do people justify this obligation or, to put
it differently, what is this obligation grounded upon? Bicchieri does
not give a final answer. But she indicates that we have a preference
to share a cake equally for example because it might be our duty to
be fair. And we hold the belief that others expect us that we ought
to share because it is the fair thing to do. But on what grounds do
people believe that the norm of equal sharing is the right thing to
do?
We could get around this problem by arguing that social norms
are often not seen to be the right thing to do. But then the ac-
cepted obligation involved seems even more difficult to understand.
To make her approach understandable, Bicchieri gives the following
example of a Muslim woman wearing a veil: although it is a widely
spread social norm, many people (in the Muslim community) might
think that wearing a veil is an unpleasant thing to do and not many
people would be prepared to sanction a transgression. This means,
people would not consider it an obligation to conform to the norm.
Each woman therefore does not necessarily believe that she ought to
follow the social norm. But she might believe that she is expected to
wear the veil in the sense that she believes that many people think
that she ought to wear a veil and that they also prefer to wear a veil
because it is an obligation or her religious duty to wear it. Because
of social pressure she will finally end up wearing it; expected sanc-
tions are necessary to guarantee conformity. Her reason to conform
18Of course, as Bicchieri rightly stresses, not all social norms are thought of
being good and people do not think that others ought to follow them. Yet,
conformity to them is widely observed. I will not consider this case here, but I
am aware that this is an important issue which has to be stressed, when norm-
conformity should be explained fully.
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is thus a kind of ‘instrumental reason’ and the type of normativity
involved has an instrumental nature. But let us look at this case in
greater detail: what this case implies is that a religious community
of extensive size would follow a norm which dramatically constrains
the ‘quality of life’ of at least half of the members of the commu-
nity, whereas ‘quality of life’ labels a lifestyle taken from the idea
of freedom of secular western societies. And it assumes that people
accept this constraint on their choices only because of other people’s
expectations, which, even worse, is based on false beliefs because, as
Bicchieri describes, these expectations do not really exist if we would
ask people for people’s actual beliefs. What this example suggests,
then, is that people live against what they really or truly value and
consider as the right thing to do, simply because of a falsely believed
existence of expectations.
This seems unreasonable to me. I guess that a vast majority of
Muslim women would wear the veil even if they would not fear any
kind of sanctions. And this is because they do it out of a religious
conviction. They have committed themselves to the values and prin-
ciples of their religious community. And they believe that conformity
to the social norm is one way of expressing this conviction. This com-
mitment is why they think they ought to follow the norm and why
they also expect others to conform. Such a view immediately loses
its validity when people have different values. Western women would
have difficulty in believing in this kind of ‘uncomfortable’ commit-
ment. Because of their commitment to other kind of values, their
motivation and the normativity involved would be different imme-
diately, i.e. rather instrumental in character. So, the conformity
to the same norm can be motivated in at least two different ways,
namely either fear of sanctions or conviction and commitment to
values and principles that are embodied in the norm. Consequently,
why people think they ought to follow a social norm also differs. As
the one is instrumental in character and guarantees conformity only
by expected sanctions, the conformity of a person who is motivated
in this way is contingent. As the other one is ‘committing’ in char-
acter and guarantees conformity also without any kind of expected
sanctions (the person conforms voluntarily and unconditionally), the
conformity of a person who is motivated in this way is necessary.
I think this relates to an idea Hume raised (Hume, 2003). Some-
times norms and values or virtues appear to be related. Bicchieri
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claims that once norms are invoked in a society, people start to fol-
low them because they attribute some value to what the norm stands
for or they have a deep conviction of the norm. Consequently, the
norm is what shapes the values of the people within a community
(Bicchieri, 2006). Accordingly, when we attribute an intrinsic value
to the norm, this gives us a reason to recognize other people’s ex-
pectations as legitimate and we feel an obligation to fulfil it. These
expectations cause us to have a preference and having a preference
causes us to conform to the norm we value or are deeply convinced
of. So their ‘value depends on widespread conformity’ (Bicchieri,
2006). I think this seems somewhat contradictory. We consider an
action worth pursuing because its properties embody certain values
and principles we already have or hold and about which we are con-
vinced. We are committed to these values and, by following a norm,
we want to implement or realize them. Consequently, it is often our
values and principles that shape social norms, not the other way
round.19 Because we are committed to the principles and values we
hold, we take it as our obligation to conform to the norm. This obli-
gation is independent, first, from our preferences and thus from what
is in our self-interest and, second, from other people’s expectations.
So, as I claimed before, I think that individuals draw on a basis
of values and principles that people commonly hold. And because
they commit themselves to these values and principles, on the one
hand, they accept other people’s evaluations and expectations about
what kind of behaviour is considered as appropriate and find them
legitimate. On the other hand, their commitment also justifies their
own expectations towards other people’s behaviour and their own
norm-compliance. This, so the economist will argue, seems vague
and does not explain properly the normativity involved. We should
rather grant people to have preferences for fairness or for other social
concerns which would replace this talk about values. And, if we
19Empirically it is probably true that in many societies certain social norms
exist before new individuals build up values that support these norms. But what
was there first and how (informal) institutions evolve are question which cannot
be addressed in this paper. However, I think that, if what the social norms
represent or imply would be contradictory to what we consider for ourselves as
acceptable and would not be more or less inline with our values, conceptions, and
ideas about the world, the way we live together in a society, and how we think
we should treat each other, then the majority of the people would not conform
to social norms.
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cannot get around the idea of commitment, we could simply assume
them to have a preference for commitment.
But what would a preference for commitment look like? Having
characterized what the nature of commitment is, it seems plausible
that the idea of a preference and what it implies — both technically
and factually — seems to be misleading in this context. Commitment
is inherently contradictory to a self-interested action and does not
lead to personal-welfare improvement in the first place (Sen, 1985,
2005). One could object that Bicchieri allows for counter-preferential
choices: in a situation where (material) rewards are present, I might
prefer more to less but when people expect me to follow a norm of
generosity ‘I might prefer to behave generously’. Is this what we in-
tuitively understand as counter-preferential choice? It rather sounds
like having a dominant preference for conforming to the norm of gen-
erosity; we can change our preference or one preference dominates
the other, but then we do not take a choice which contrasts our
preferences. Thus, the action is still based on and not against our
preferences.
This relates to the point that the dominant role of expectations
and the way in which we form our preference for social norms seems
quite odd. Bicchieri unifies preference-formation and the existence
of expectations and does not focus on whether other’s expectations
make any sense for us. In the long run, it would be impossible for an
agent to keep his promises in a world where nobody kept theirs. He
would have to change his preference in accordance with the change
of his beliefs about other’s expectations, independent of whether
he cares about taking the specific action ‘keeping a promise’, i.e.
whether he judges the action of keeping promises as good or the
right thing to do. It does not matter what kind of behaviour we
believe to be expected, it could be keeping a promise or it could
be jumping as high as we can when we see a green bird. But —
according to the theory — whether we consider the action to follow a
norm worth pursuing or the right thing to do (which is obviously not
the same as having a preference) does not matter.20 This conflicts
with the idea of commitment. But why would people prefer what
other people expect them to do, no matter how ‘stupid’ it seems to
20Note that on this account it is very likely that norm-guided behaviour will
change with circumstances, because expectations may be different in distinct
contexts, which changes the preference of the agent and thus his behaviour.
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be? Why would all Muslim women accept to be strongly limited in
their personal freedom, if they completely disagreed with what the
norm says and even formed a preference to this extent?21 Even if this
point appeals only to our intuition and thus has yet to be proven,
I doubt that any expectations we believe people to hold have this
power to form people’s preferences accordingly.
This leads us to the last point, namely that awareness, self-
reflexion and conscious deliberation are not necessary conditions for
following a norm in Bicchieri’s account. She claims that we often un-
consciously follow social norms, while she defines a mental state to be
conscious when it is accompanied by roughly simultaneous, higher-
order thought about that very mental state. This understanding of
awareness is reminiscent of conscious deliberation modelled in ratio-
nal choice theory. In a cost-benefit-analysis, we consciously weigh
our options available. In this context, deliberation is based on the
beliefs and desires of which we are aware in the abovementioned
sense. I believe that Bicchieri understates the importance of this
kind of awareness and claims that we often make use of heuristics to
‘choose’ our actions, especially when it comes to norm-conformity.
And she might be right in many cases. However, in the context of
norm-conformity motivated by commitment, awareness also requires
making judgements and it implies self-consciousness achieved by a
process of deliberating about how we act on the whole. We draw
on our experience of how we acted in the past and why we acted
as we did to make sure that our action was worth pursuing and to
adapt/improve our action in the future, having in mind certain fun-
damental values and principles to which we commit ourselves. As
said before, because of this commitment, people use their values and
principles for assessment. These values and principles for assessment
are different from the notion of value implied by Bicchieri’s claim that
some social norms may become part of our system of values, and that
we may feel a strong obligation to obey them (Bicchieri, 2006). In-
21Of course, the economist would argue that Bicchieri’s account is just a ra-
tional reconstruction and does not aim at showing how people’s real preferences
are (Bicchieri, 2006). But besides the fact, that a rational reconstruction of an
account for norm-conformity seems problematic as people, depending on their
motives, conform to social norms in a more or less stable manner, it seems prob-
lematic to talk about what shapes people’s preferences in the first place, when
we just assume that people have preferences. In this case the whole talk about
expectations would loose importance.
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stead, as mentioned before, the concept of commitment implies that
some norm-governed actions embody people’s values and principles.
And because the norm embodies the values and principles we are
committed to, it has a normative claim on us which is a general
claim independent of the situation. So, once we judge an action as
worth pursuing on the basis of our values and principles, we have
the duty to pursue it; in case of social norms ‘we obey ourselves’ to
conform. The awareness of the existence of these properties, of the
fact that they provide us with a reason to act, and of the values and
principles we hold is therefore crucial when we want to account for
the motive of commitment.
Economists might argue that, if we do not have a preference for
the norm, these values constrain us in following our desires, so why
should we commit ourselves to them? Let me give a constructivist
answer to that question: these assessment criteria are constructed
by the agents themselves through their own will (Korsgaard, 1997).
During the process of deliberation, where the agent engages in critical
thinking, he enlarges his perspective and option-set and gets a deeper
understanding of the situation and of himself (Wallace, 2003). He
becomes conscious of values and principles on which he wants to base
his actions. This process does change his intentions; it is a kind of
self-determination. Instead of passively reacting to his desires, he
deliberates and assesses his own reasons for his actions on the basis
of these values and principles. And because they reflect his overall
view of what is worth to pursue in life, he wills them to have a claim
on him.
To sum up, Bicchieri’s definition of social norms has the advan-
tage of being operational. It provides us with a pragmatic frame-
work. It has empirical, testable content which allows us to predict
norm-governed behaviour, especially in experimental settings. At
the same time it is highly flexible and sophisticated enough to in-
clude aspects like emotions and internalization of norms. However,
while it is able to explain nearly all types of motives people can have
for norm-conformity, it also shows that an action motivated by com-
mitment cannot be explained. The only way out would be to induce
a preference for commitment but this is not what we are looking for,
as personal welfare-improvement and self-interest are not part of the
motive of commitment. Hence, it is problematic to account for norm-
conformity in a satisfactory way with an approach where choice is
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based on the motive of (immediate) satisfaction of individual desires
or preferences and thereby aiming at personal welfare-improvements.
IV.
It has to be analysed further whether the theory of human behaviour
used in economics to explain norm-conformity fulfils its explanatory
and predictive role when accounting for norm-conformity. It has to
be asked how useful economic explanations of norm-conformity are.
To enhance their usefulness and adequacy on the one hand, and be
more realistic in what they predict on the other, we have to under-
stand what really motivates people. And finding out the motivation,
the normativity involved in the conformity of the people, plays a cru-
cial role. Thus, analysing the normativity involved would help us to
improve our explanations in economics and explain cases of coopera-
tion which are just ad hoc explained by standard as-if-models based
on the rational choice approach. This difference in motivation and
thus in the normativity involved has two important consequences.
First, it has important implications on a methodological level when
giving an explanation of norm-conformity. The explanation based on
an account where normativity is assumed to be purely instrumental
seems to be misplaced, as it ignores the possibility for a normativ-
ity of a different type. Second, it has important implications on a
conceptual level. For, what we define as a social norm in contrast
to other rules depends on why people think they ought to follow the
social norm, i.e. what motivates their conformity. And if some mo-
tives can be covered but others are left out we can have legitimate
doubts about the usefulness of the explanation provided.
My guess is that there are two ways out of this ‘explanatory
dilemma’. Either, we fully dismiss economic models when it comes
to explaining norm-conformity. Or, we conduct further theoretical
and empirical research in this specific area to extend the economic
model, improve our utility functions and provide better cognitive
and behavioural assumptions of the agents.
IV Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to show the difficulty economists have
in accommodating the motive of commitment in their explanatory
frameworks for norm-conformity. This is because in the case of norm-
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conformity, the normativity involved can be instrumental and/or
committing. Of course, people’s behaviour is complex and a theo-
retical framework will probably never cover all of the potential mo-
tivations for following social norms. However, I conclude that if
we aim at reasonable explanations of norm-conformity, all possible
motives should be considered. The concept of preferences is often
misleading when it comes to explaining norm-conformity, as it dis-
misses the normative dimension of agency, i.e. the ability of the
agent to undertake judgements and make choices independently of
one’s personal desires or inclination, i.e. independent of what is in
the person’s self-interest. Instead of granting the agent all types of
preferences, to find out the motivation behind norm-conformity, it
is rather useful to analyse the normativity involved in what moti-
vates agents to conform to social norms. The type of normativity
or the ‘ought’ involved in social norms differs remarkably, depending
on the motivation people have. I argued that we have to distinguish
between two forms of normativity involved in norm-conformity: one
is what I called ‘instrumental normativity’, which is well captured by
the economic framework and the notion of preferences. The second is
a kind of ‘normativity of commitment’, which, so the argument was,
cannot be captured by economic theory. Depending on people’s mo-
tivation, they consider conformity as normative either in one of the
two senses or in both at the same time. The main difficulty of the
economic theory to account for these aspects lies in its general un-
derstanding of what is meant when we say that somebody acts for a
reason and what we consider as being rational within the framework.
It does not account either for the kind of reason we are provided with
when acting from commitment, nor for what we consider as a ratio-
nal in this context. Thus, if we accept commitment as a motivational
source, then we must challenge our notion of reasons, i.e. the nature
of the desires and beliefs involved in reasons for conformity and our
understanding of what it means to act rationality in this context.
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